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SUMMARY
To keep password users from creating simple and common passwords, major
websites and applications provide a password-strength measure, namely a password
checker that displays instant password strength ratings in levels e.g., “strong”, “mod-
erate”, and “weak”. While critical requirements for a password checker to be strin-
gent have prevailed in the study of password security, we find that regardless of the
stringency, such static checkers can leak information and actually help the adversary
enhance the performance of their attacks. To address this weakness, we propose and
devise the Dynamic Password Policy Generator, namely DPPG, to be an effective and
usable alternative to the existing password strength checker. DPPG aims to enforce
an evenly-distributed password space and generate dynamic policies for users to cre-
ate passwords that are diverse and contribute to the overall security of the password
database. Since DPPG is modular and can function with different underlying metrics
for policy generation, we further introduce a diversity-based password security metric
that evaluates the security of a password database in terms of password space and
distribution. The metric is useful as a countermeasure to well-crafted offline cracking




Text-based passwords have been used widely in both online and offline applications
for decades. Since passwords are personal and portable, they are not likely to be
replaced in the foreseeable future [49]. However, the phenomenon that people choose
simple passwords and reuse common passwords [38] has raised great security con-
cerns as such passwords are vulnerable to offline cracking attacks. To make things
worse, a number of password leakage incidents [5, 7, 10, 3] have happened recently
and frequently. Large datasets of leaked passwords can greatly enhance the attack-
ers’ capability in conducting training-based password attacks, thus posing significant
threats on password security.
The most direct and pervasive protective mechanism used by major websites and
applications is the password strength checker [39], which evaluates the strength of
passwords proactively during user registration. While the goal is to guide users to
create strong passwords, in previous work [108, 23, 55], the lack of accuracy and
consistency in the strength feedback has been widely observed and examined. That
is, existing checkers do not demonstrate effective or uniform characterization of strong
passwords. Furthermore, the space for the rules and policies of the checkers to be
stringent is very limited as researchers have shown that the complexity of a password
is a trade-off with the usability [113]. Therefore, password strength checkers simply
cannot demand users to create passwords that are too complex.
On the other hand, the password strength checker itself can be a vulnerability,
which has not been studied in previous research. By defining a set of password cre-
ation policies and showing users password strength scores, password checkers can exert
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a strong bias on the password characteristics, especially when the policies and scoring
mechanisms remain static. The passwords registered to a database are largely similar
to the specific password patterns enforced by the associated checker. Although pass-
word checkers vary among websites, they inevitably rely on similar rules that focus
on specific password properties (e.g., length, number of digits and special characters).
When rules are relatively relaxed, password users may create simple passwords fol-
lowing a common distribution. When rules are relatively demanding, the password
distribution is closely correlated to the scoring metrics and can be inferred. Since
the password checkers are publicly available, attackers can easily make use of the
password checkers to learn the password characteristics distribution that is shaped
by the password checkers.
Our main contributions in this thesis are summarized as follows.
• In Chapter 3, we evaluate the impact of misusing current commercial password
strength checkers from the attacker’s perspective and explore the possibility and
potential to leverage the checkers in offline cracking attacks. Using an attack-
based model, we show that the password checkers are effective for attackers to
facilitate password cracking. With a certain amount of computational power,
the attacker can compromise more passwords with a specific rating with the
help of the strength checkers. This implies that the static policies and scoring
mechanisms used by the password strength checkers exert bias on the password
characteristics distribution. Passwords with the same rating follow an obvious
pattern which can be exploited by the attacker to refine the training data.
• In Chapter 4, to propose a countermeasure to protect the information on pass-
word distribution and to reduce the efficacy of well-crafted training-based at-
tacks, we devise the Dynamic Password Policy Generator, namely DPPG, which
generates dynamic password policies for users. Each new user obtains a different
password policy to follow, which is generated in real-time from the server based
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on but not reflecting the current password distribution. The policies thus are
not static and a user does not know what policies others receive. DPPG works
to even out the password distribution in the database and expand the password
space. Since the policies users receive are dynamic, and unpredictable, the ad-
versary cannot use them to infer the characteristics of the password database
or select password training data.
• To further understand the password distribution and evaluate the threats posed
by the exposure of the password distribution of a leaked dataset, we introduce
the concept of password diversity and propose a diversity-based metric to mea-
sure the security of a password dataset in Chapter 5. The metric considers
an aggregation of password properties to analyze the password characteristics
distribution within a dataset. It assigns a higher security score to a password
dataset with a more uniform password distribution. The metric serves as the
underlying mechanism used in DPPG to generate dynamic policies and aims
to minimize biased password distributions and to expand the usable password
space. Since the training-based attacks become powerful due to strong similar-





In this chapter, we clarify the terminology used throughout the thesis and summarize
the related work in major domains of password security research.
2.1 Terminology
Within the domain of password cracking research, we use training-free to refer to
cracking algorithms that do not need input passwords data and generate guesses in-
dependently. Training-free algorithms can quickly compromise simple and common
passwords, e.g., dictionary words. We use training-based on the other hand to
denote algorithms that require training data, which work better to crack more com-
plicated passwords with human textual patterns. When studying similarity, we use
password characteristics, attributes, and properties interchangeably to refer to
password length, number of character types, structure, and etc. We use password
space to denote the variability of passwords with a set of constraints e.g., for pass-
words that are 10 characters long and contain only numerical digits, the password
space has two dimensions with a size of 1010. We define password distribution
in terms of password attributes in a dataset, such as the appearance frequencies of
certain characters, character types and etc. In Chapter 5, we detect communities
of passwords based on their similarity and password distribution can be approxi-
mated by the distribution of communities.
2.2 Password Cracking
John the Ripper is a popular commercial offline password cracking application and
has been widely used in password security research. It has different modes such as
4
Single, Wordlist, Incremental, and Markov mode. Single mode performs mangling
on auxiliary information, typically the usernames associated with the passwords;
Wordlist mode is an efficient dictionary attack with optional mangling rules; and
Incremental mode uses smart brute-forcing and attempt to exhaust the entire pass-
word space given enough time. The only training-based algorithm lies in the Markov
mode, which trains a given password dataset to extract characteristic information
and build Markov chains to generate password guesses. As shown in the previous
literature [19, 55], training-based algorithms, in most scenarios, have much better
cracking performance than training-free algorithms. In this thesis, we only consider
the Markov mode and denote it as JtR.
In [109], Weir et al. proposed a training-based password cracking algorithm using
Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars, namely PCFG. The algorithm first surveys the
structural distribution from a training dataset. The password structure is generated
by replacing each character in the passwords with its character type. In PCFG, 3
character types are considered which are, L that stands for lower-case or upper-case
alphabet, D that stands for numerical digit, and S that stands for special character.
In this thesis, we further use L and U to represent lower-case and upper-case alpha-
bets separately. For example, “Pwd@1” has a structure of “ULLSD”. By using the
structural distribution, PCFG then applies mangling rules to the structures in the
decreasing order of likelihood and generates guesses.
Taking another approach, in [75], Narayanan and Shmatikov proposed to use stan-
dard Markov modeling techniques to drastically reduce the password search space and
designed the first Markov model-based algorithm. Markov-based cracking algorithm
extracts information from the training dataset to construct Markov Chains which can
enumerate the password search space efficiently based on the prior knowledge. In [24],
Castelluccia et al. improved the Markov model and proposed to build an n-gram
based Markov model to generate password guesses, However, the algorithm in [75, 24]
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cannot generate password guesses in the decreasing order of likelihood. To address
this limitation, Dürmuth et al. further proposed an improved Markov-based pass-
word cracking algorithm, namely Ordered Markov ENumerator in [34] which makes
guesses in the decreasing order of likelihood. We denote it as OMEN for short. Fur-
thermore, they also extended OMEN to OMEN+ and consider users’ social profiles
during password cracking.
2.3 Password Strength Measurement
The trade off between usability and stringency of the password requirements has also
been explored extensively. In [89], Shay et al. found that users struggle with new and
complex password requirements. In [71], Mazurek et al. measured the strength of
passwords created by over 25K university students, faculty, and staff. They found that
users who expressed annoyance with complex password creation policies tend to create
more vulnerable passwords. Reporting the same issue, Shay et al. in [89] conducted
a survey of 470 CMU computer users to find that users struggle with new password
requirements, especially the complex ones. These work report the issues that while
complex password creation policies might enhance the security of passwords, general
usability is compensated. Therefore it is meaningful to ensure the proper level of
complexity in password policies. In [66], Li et al. conduct an empirical analysis of
Chinese web passwords. According to their statistical results, user-chosen passwords
have explicit regional differences. In [17], Bonneau analyzed an anonymized corpus of
70M Yahoo! passwords. He estimated that passwords provide fewer than 10 bits of
security against an online, trawling attack, and only about 20 bits of security against
an optimal offline dictionary attack. He also found that graphical feedback during
the password selection process makes little difference in improving password security,
and seemingly distant language communities choose the same weak passwords.
Traditional password strength metric has been found ineffective through previous
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work. In [108], Weir et al. evaluated various traditional metric, e.g., NIST entropy,
for password creation policies by attacking leaked passwords using their PCFG based
cracking algorithm. They found that the NIST entropy and other conventional met-
ric are not effective for password security, and proposed new PCFG cracking-based
password creation policies. Another work employing the password cracking idea to
measure password strength is [59], where Kelley et al. analyzed 12K passwords col-
lected under seven composition policies via an online study. They also concluded that
the effectiveness of using entropy as a measure of password guessability is very limited.
In [70], Ma et al. conducted a study of probabilistic password models. They proposed
a probability-threshold graph model to capture the probability threshold distribution
in log scale versus the percentage of passwords above the threshold.
Although interesting proposals have been made to replace traditional metric, the
new approaches are still based on the complexity of individual passwords without
considering the overall password distribution of a password database. Similarity be-
tween individual passwords and how it could affect the security of passwords in bulk
are not studied.
The existing password checkers have also been studied in a variety of ways, but
mainly in terms of their accuracies and effectiveness in indicating the strength of indi-
vidual passwords. In [23], Carnavalet and Mannan studied existing password checkers
by analyzing feedback from 11 commercial checkers on passwords in various datasets.
They found significant inconsistencies among different checkers, which may confuse
users. Ji et al. in [55] further conducted attack-based analysis on commercial check-
ers to find that many of them provide inaccurate and misleading feedback. Ur et
al., in [104], also studied the effect of strength checkers on password creation. They
found that password resistance could only increase when the checkers score passwords
stringently. To suggest a different approach than traditional checkers, Castelluccia
et al. presented adaptive password strength meter that estimate password strength
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using Markov models [24]. They also proposed a secure implementation of the pre-
sented concept. However, the checker solely relies on n-gram which does not consider
structural and other information. In [53], Houshmand and Aggarwal proposed a tool,
named Analyzer and Modifier for Passwords (AMP), to help users choose stronger
passwords. AMP first estimates a password’s crackability based on the PCFG cracking
model, and then modifies the weak password slightly to meet the security require-
ment. Komanduri et al. implemented another tool, namely Telepathwords, to help
users create strong passwords [62]. As a user creates a password, Telepathwords pre-
vents weak passwords by making realtime predictions of the next character that the
user will type. In [42], Forget et al. also developed a tool, namely Persuasive Text
Passwords (PTP), which leverages the persuasive technology principle to influence
users in creating more secure passwords without sacrificing usability. Schmidt and
Jaeger evaluated the security of automated strengthening of passwords [87]. They
found that passwords that were strengthened are still susceptible to modern cracks,
provided that the adversary knows the strengthening algorithm. The work most re-
lated to this thesis is [83], where Schechter et al. proposed to prevent users from
creating popular passwords using a bloom filter. However, the filter only recognizes
popular passwords rather than having the capability to identify popular password
patterns.
Again, extensive studies have shown that password checkers lack the accuracy in
reflecting the proper strength levels of passwords, and new strength checkers adopting
more rigorous algorithms are observed to have better effectiveness. However, not much
focus has been put on protecting the security of password distributional information.
According to Kerckhoffs’s principle, an attacker can learn the system and optimize the
attack. In this thesis, we set aside evaluating the effectiveness of password checkers,
and study the possibility of such checkers leaking crucial passwords distributional
information. We also propose a new mechanism to render dynamic policies that
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minimize the attacker’s ability to learn the system.
2.4 Password Security Evaluation
In [38], Florêncio and Herley conducted a large scale study of password habits. Several
interesting facts are found in the study such as on average a user has 6.5 passwords,
and each of which is shared across 3.9 different sites. Similar to [38], Gaw and Felten
studied the password reuse phenomenon [45]. Based on a study of 49 undergraduate
students, they concluded that the majority of users have three or fewer passwords
and their passwords are reused twice. Stobert and Biddle also studied user behavior
in managing multiple passwords [93]. They found that many users reuse and write
down passwords. In [19], Bonneau et al. evaluated two decades of text-password
alternatives. They found that many alternatives fail to consider a sufficiently wide
range of real world constraints, and thus text-passwords will still be the dominat-
ing authentication method in the foreseeable future. Schmidt and Jaeger evaluated
the security of automated strengthening of passwords [87]. They found that pass-
words that were strengthened are still susceptible to modern cracks, provided that
the adversary knows the strengthening algorithm.
As summarized above, the password reuse phenomenon is pervasive and concern-
ing. This means that a user who reuses a password frequently will have the same
password in many password databases. If the number of such users are large, dif-
ferent password databases will resemble each other thus sharing a common password
distribution. Therefore, it is meaningful to study how the password distribution will
affect the security of password databases.
In [36], Fahl et al. presented a study on the ecological validity of password stud-
ies, which can help researchers design proper user study settings. In [47], Haque
et al. investigated the issue of user comfort from the viewpoint of psychometrics
by developing a questionnaire. Kuo et al. evaluated human selection of mnemonic
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phrase-based passwords [65]. They concluded that user-generated mnemonic pass-
words are slightly more resistant. In [20], Bonneau and Schechter challenged the
conventional wisdom that users cannot remember cryptographically-strong secrets.
Through a study, they demonstrated that users can learn randomly-assigned 56-bit
codes. In [27], Chiasson et al. presented a usability study of two recent password
managers PwdHash and Password Multiplier. Their findings suggest that ordinary
users would be reluctant to use these managers. Jeyaraman and Topkara proposed
and evaluated an automatic memorable mnemonics generation system for a given
password based on a text-corpus [54]. Their results show that automatic mnemonic
generation is a promising technique to improve the usability of text-password sys-
tems. In [88], Shay et al. evaluated the usability of system-assigned passphrases.
They found that system-assigned passphrases and passwords have similar entropy
with respect to the examined usability metric.
2.5 Password Management
In [117], Yee and Sitaker designed Passpet for password management. In [16], Bojinov
et al. introduced Kamouflage, a new architecture to build theft-resistant password
managers. Florêncio et al. studied how to manage a portfolio of passwords in [41].
Molloy and Li evaluated the security of GridCode, a one-time password system [74].
In [44], Gasti and Rasmussen studied the security of password manager database
formats. Another recent study on password managers is [67], where Li et al. found
that it is still a challenge for existing password managers to be secure. In [91], Silver
et al. studied the security of popular password managers.
2.6 Password Protection
In [57], Juels and Rivest proposed Honeywords to improve the security of hashed
passwords. Florêncio and Herley studied how to securely enter passwords on a spy-
ware infected machine in [37]. They proposed three countermeasures using passwords
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embedding in random keystrokes and a shared-secret proxy. In [64], Kumar et al.
proposed to reduce shoulder-surfing by using gaze-based password entry. In [48],
Hart presented a phishing resistant password ceremony, PhorceField. To protect user
accounts from password database leaks, Kontaxis et al. proposed SAuth [63]. In [68],
Liu et al. designed and implemented ScreenPass, which significantly improves the
security of passwords on touchscreen devices. For improving users’ password man-
agement, Kim et al. introduced YourPassword. In [95], Stock and Johns proposed
an alternative password manager design. In [28], Cox et al. presented SpanDex for
secure password tracking in Android. In [72], McCarney et al. proposed Tapas, an




Most of the existing research only evaluates the effectiveness and helpfulness of the
password strength checkers. The fact that the checkers are based on unchanged
policies which indirectly bias the password characteristics distribution has not been
studied. Furthermore, due to the exposure of the policies and scoring mechanisms [23,
55, 56], careful attackers can utilize the password checkers to mount more powerful
attacks on passwords with high strength ratings.
3.1 Datasets, Checkers, and Crackers
Table 1 lists the 5 datasets that add up to around 81 million passwords. The datasets
are leaked from several incidents [29, 70] where attackers acquire passwords by online
attacking techniques. Although the password data were leaked illegally, it has been
once made publicly available and used widely in password research for benevolent
purposes. In our study, we use the passwords for research only without attempting
to verify them.
To obtain a collection of usable password strength checkers and cracking algo-
rithms, we conduct our experiments with PARS [55]. Bloomberg is a popular English
business and news forum and QQ is a well-known Chinese portal providing numerous
web services. According to evaluations in [55, 56], they provide relatively accurate
Table 1: Datasets.
Name Size Language Site Type
Renren 4.7M Chinese renren.com/ social networks
LinkedIn 5.4M English linkedin.com/ professional networks
Tianya 31M Chinese tianya.cn/ Internet forum
Rockyou 32.6M English rockyou.com/ game
Gamigo 6.3M German en.gamigo.com/ game
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Table 2: Percentage of “Strong” Passwords.
checker Gamigo Renren LinkedIn Rockyou Tianya
Bloomberg-Train 0.05% 6.30% 0.31% 0.72% 0.44%
Bloomberg-Test 0.05% 6.27% 0.31% 0.72% 0.44%
QQ-Train 12.44% 22.20% 1.75% 2.56% 5.20%
QQ-Test 12.44% 22.12% 1.74% 2.56% 5.20%
Figure 1: Attack-based Evaluation Model
Table 3: Cross-Site Password Cracking (Bloomberg’s Password Checker).
Training Renren LinkedIn Rockyou
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Renren - - - - - - 3.57% 7.17% 2.59% 7.17% 2.43% 10.97% 1.75% 15.32% 1.13% 19.22% 0.29% 11.34%
LinkedIn 0.23% 1.94% 0.05% 1.14% 0.01% 10.49% - - - - - - 0.66% 5.87% 0.41% 7.98% 0.03% 14.29%
Rockyou 1.09% 6.90% 0.26% 4.30% 0.08% 18.59% 10.00% 17.37% 6.22% 15.54% 6.91% 21.57% - - - - - -
Tianya 1.43% 4.81% 0.73% 4.78% 0.01% 9.77% 2.83% 5.46% 2.82% 6.70% 1.87% 11.89% 1.14% 5.41% 1.00% 6.93% 0.16% 11.28%
Gamigo 0.67% 4.37% 0.36% 3.46% 0.00% 20.41% 4.74% 12.76% 4.80% 15.13% 6.62% 24.30% 2.13% 11.48% 1.15% 15.37% 0.24% 25.15%
Training Tianya Gamigo
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Renren 1.69% 16.21% 0.80% 16.31% 0.07% 9.24% 0.15% 6.00% 0.01% 1.58% 0.12% 7.74%
LinkedIn 0.17% 3.24% 0.05% 0.85% 0.01% 9.04% 0.03% 6.48% 0.01% 1.17% 0.12% 11.47%
Rockyou 0.86% 8.84% 0.12% 1.85% 0.06% 10.79% 0.57% 15.53% 0.01% 2.70% 0.32% 19.96%
Tianya - - - - - - 0.07% 4.53% 0.02% 1.36% 0.07% 5.75%
Gamigo 0.55% 5.65% 0.06% 1.94% 0.00% 16.28% 0.18% 13.00% 0.00% 3.77% 0.06% 22.24%
and consistent feedback to users. There are 4 levels of password strength in both
password checkers to make them comparable, and the highest rating is “strong” in
common.
We use three state-of-the-art password cracking algorithms, JtR (John the Ripper-
Markov) [9], OMEN (Ordered Markov ENumerator) [34], and PCFG (Probabilistic
Context-free Grammar) [109], which have relatively optimal performance in password




Figure 2: Intra-site Password Cracking (Bloomberg and QQ Password Checkers).
3.2 Threat Model: Take Your Checker, Crack Your Pass-
words
From an attacker’s perspective, we evaluate quantitatively how existing commercial
password checkers can be used to enhance offline password attacks. We are particu-
larly interested in the pool of “strong” passwords because intuitively users trust the
strength feedback and create passwords that have better ratings.
In our threat model, we assume an attacker aims to crack a target set of password
hashes leaked from a website which uses a password strength checker. This means
that the hashed passwords can have different strength ratings1. We also assume
the attacker has access to the checker and obtained another dataset of plain text
passwords leaked from other websites as prior knowledge, which is used to train the
password crackers. Since the attacker does not know the correlation between the plain
text and the hashed passwords, a straightforward strategy is to assume a common
1In general, strength checkers can accept passwords of any ratings from “weak” to “strong”, but
there are only several ratings available.
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distribution in both datasets and use all the plain text passwords to train the cracking
model. However, the target passwords might have been created mostly by users who
trust the strength feedback from the checker and create passwords only if they are
labelled as “strong”. Then, the target passwords are reasonably dissimilar from the
training passwords which come from other sources. Therefore, to compromise such
biased target passwords, the attacker will likely have better cracking results if the
training passwords are also “strong”.
In our experiment, the objective is to see if more “strong” passwords in the target
dataset can be compromised when the attacker uses the password strength checker to
select training data. Figure 1 summarizes the evaluation process. First, we randomly
select 50% of the passwords from a dataset in Table 1 to be the Nonselective Training
dataset. Then, we apply a password strength checker in Table 2 to score each password
in the Nonselective Training dataset, and select only those passwords labelled as
“strong” to make up the the Selective Training dataset. From the other 50% of the
passwords, we apply the same checker selection method to build the Testing dataset.
Finally, we use Nonselective Training and Selective Training datasets separately, as
input to JtR, OMEN, and PCFG, to crack the Testing dataset.
In Table 2, we show the percentages of selected passwords from the datasets, e.g.,
Bloomberg-Train and Bloomberg-Test indicate the percentages of “strong” passwords
marked by Bloomberg’s checker in the datasets from which we sample training and
testing data, respectively. Since we randomly divide an original dataset into halves,
the distributions of “strong” passwords in both halves are approximately the same.
To conduct a comprehensive and comparable evaluation, we perform passwords
cracking in both Intra-site and Cross-site scenarios. In Intra-site cracking, the train-
ing data and target data come from the same original dataset and in Cross-site
cracking, the training data is from a different dataset. To make the comparison fair,
we limit each cracking session to 10 billion passwords guesses uniformly. We present
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intra-site cracking results of Renren, LinkedIn, Rockyou, and Tianya in Figure 2, and
cross-site cracking results with Bloomberg’s password checker in Table 3.
In Figure 2, the intra-site results show that Selective Training enable all the
cracking algorithms to compromise much more “strong” passwords than Nonselective
Training. Figure 2 (a) shows the cracking scenario where the passwords are selected by
Bloomberg’s checker. The performance gain of using Selective Training is significant.
Specifically, regarding PCFG, with Nonselective Training, it can only crack 0.07%,
4.58%, 0.22%, and 0.01% of the passwords in the target data from Renren, LinkedIn,
Rockyou, and Tianya, respectively, whereas with Selective Training, it can crack
31.15%, 15.40%, 24.78%, and 14.37%, respectively.
Figure 2 (b) shows the cracking scenario where QQ’s checker is used. Although
Selective Training can boost the cracking capability uniformly, the performance gain
is smaller compared to that with Bloomberg’s checker. For Tianya, we see that the
cracking results of Nonselective Training and Selective Training are almost the same
when JtR and PCFG are in use. The likely reason for this phenomenon is that
QQ’s checker is not as stringent as Bloomberg’s, thus having less bias on the selected
“strong” passwords. Another interesting observation is that PCFG, in Figure 2 (a)
and (b) has very different performance. It shows much more performance gain when
Bloomberg’s checker is used. Due to PCFG’s nature, this confirms that Bloomberg’s
checker is more stringent on password structure than QQ’s checker.
In Table 3, we show the results of cross-site cracking with Bloomberg’s password
checker. Surprisingly, we see that the cracking performance with Selective Training
is uniformly and significantly better without exception. Gamigo, as a typical dataset
with German linguistic patterns, is also subjective to a greater cracking enhancement
when the adversary uses the checkers to select training data from a Chinese or English
dataset e.g., a performance gain of up to 24% is observed when training from Rockyou
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and cracking with PCFG. This means that regardless of where attackers obtain pass-
words for training, they can always improve their cracking capability drastically by
using the password checker associated with the target data to make a good selection
of training data 2.
Our attack-based evaluation is meaningful in the following ways. We do not
make assumptions on what datasets the attacker possesses. We show that as long
as the corresponding password checker of the target dataset exists, the attacker can
successfully crack more passwords in the target dataset that are labelled as “strong”.
In our experiment, Nonselective Training represents the original dataset that the
attacker has, without applying any selection. This makes sense as the attacker will
not have prior knowledge of how to select the training data simply because the target
dataset is hashed. When the password checker is available, it provides information
for the attacker about the target dataset, thus enabling them to select training data
accordingly. Therefore, it is meaningful to compare the cracking performance with
and without the password checker.
The testing dataset represents the target dataset that attackers aim to compro-
mise, which in our case is limited to only passwords rated “strong” by the password
checkers. This can be applied to passwords of any ratings, e.g., “moderate”, “weak”.
Although we do not have Bloomberg or QQ’s password datasets, by using their check-
ers to sample data from the available datasets, we can regard the selected data as
their fair representatives.
To better understand how the adversary can leverage commercial password strength
checkers, we conduct attack-based evaluation in Figure 6 on more password strength
checkers in PARS [55]. In Figure 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, we show the results of evaluating
QQ, Target, Twitter, Yahoo! and 12306.cn’s password strength checkers, respectively,
2Of course, as previous work has shown, choosing a training dataset that has similar characteris-
tics as the target dataset is also important to optimize cracking (e.g., choose a Chinese dataset for
training if the target dataset is likely Chinese).
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Table 4: Password Cracking (QQ’s Password Checker).
Training Renren LinkedIn Rockyou
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Renren 0.22% 1.85% 0.70% 3.78% 7.24% 6.73% 3.10%5.64% 5.87% 9.29% 7.64% 7.57% 0.58% 4.64% 2.43% 6.59% 7.51% 7.51%
LinkedIn 0.20% 2.12% 0.61% 4.11% 6.88% 8.22% 3.77%7.96% 7.69% 14.74% 9.36% 11.20%0.63% 5.98% 2.45% 7.90% 7.33% 10.79%
Rockyou 4.15%37.80%5.28%13.48%28.32%31.57%3.29%5.76% 6.19% 9.58% 7.81% 9.56% 1.19% 6.85% 3.30% 7.99% 6.55% 10.18%
Tianya 0.45% 3.53% 1.49% 7.81% 11.17%15.50%5.63%9.76%11.31%17.87%16.17%19.97%2.01%10.78%7.10%17.50%11.90%21.20%
Gamigo 0.37% 0.85% 0.43% 1.44% 0.79% 1.58% 0.46%0.80% 0.99% 1.58% 1.08% 1.86% 0.25% 0.87% 0.51% 1.33% 0.69% 2.04%
Training Tianya Gamigo
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Renren 0.05% 0.16% 0.07% 0.67% 6.51% 5.65% 0.74%1.84%2.08% 9.16% 7.30% 7.15%
LinkedIn 0.06% 0.28% 0.06% 0.72% 6.32% 6.40% 0.63%1.61%1.26% 8.86% 6.95% 6.76%
Rockyou 0.91% 2.57% 0.89% 6.95% 5.75% 7.48% 0.73%1.68%1.55% 7.36% 6.21% 6.05%
Tianya 0.14% 0.44% 0.16% 1.68% 9.89%10.90%1.07%2.36%2.28%12.58%11.27%10.98%
Gamigo 50.07%50.21%1.59%20.69%0.84% 1.85% 0.11%0.32%0.25% 1.08% 0.59% 0.53%
Table 5: Password Cracking (Target’s Password Checker).
Training Renren LinkedIn Rockyou
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 0.00% 0.09% 0.14% 3.33% 11.39% 10.00% 0.00% 0.23% 1.32% 8.16% 11.95% 13.89% 0.00% 0.08% 0.38% 8.97% 12.65% 14.11%
LinkedIn 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 1.11% 3.89% 3.78% 0.00% 0.36% 0.95% 6.11% 4.29% 7.45% 0.00% 0.02% 0.09% 3.49% 4.48% 6.52%
Renren 0.00% 0.22% 0.49% 6.69% 8.74% 8.85% 0.00% 0.11% 1.24% 7.45% 9.23% 10.79% 0.00% 0.00% 0.59% 8.15% 9.55% 11.17%
Rockyou 0.00% 0.06% 0.16% 2.43% 6.51% 5.81% 0.00% 0.14% 0.90% 5.52% 7.00% 8.47% 0.00% 0.06% 0.43% 8.07% 7.43% 8.47%
Tianya 0.01% 0.13% 0.25% 1.64% 1.55% 1.08% 0.00% 0.06% 0.35% 1.83% 1.02% 1.41% 0.00% 0.02% 0.22% 2.18% 1.13% 1.41%
Training Tianya Gamigo
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 1.57% 7.64% 12.88% 0.00% 1.26% 0.46% 10.84% 12.13% 14.46%
LinkedIn 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.55% 2.66% 4.52% 0.00% 0.22% 0.04% 2.41% 4.15% 5.18%
Renren 0.05% 0.70% 0.32% 6.69% 5.83% 10.79% 0.00% 0.65% 0.11% 5.83% 9.01% 10.36%
Rockyou 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 1.22% 4.22% 7.11% 0.00% 0.42% 0.12% 4.31% 6.82% 7.74%
Tianya 0.01% 0.44% 0.18% 7.23% 1.83% 3.13% 0.01% 0.23% 0.15% 1.47% 0.96% 1.30%
which are consistent with out observation and conclusions.
Remarks. In this chapter, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation to study the
feasibility and effectiveness for attackers to use existing commercial password strength
checkers to launch more powerful attacks. The results are surprising that commercial
password checkers can actually significantly help attackers compromise more “strong”
passwords rated by the password strength checkers. This means that if the users trust
a password strength checker and always creates “strong” passwords, their accounts are
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Table 6: Password Cracking (Twitter’s Password Checker).
Training Renren LinkedIn Rockyou
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 0.14% 0.91% 0.16% 1.71% 1.07% 11.45% 0.90% 3.54% 2.16% 6.97% 3.68% 14.39% 0.47% 3.15% 1.09% 5.65% 1.05% 14.81%
LinkedIn 0.12% 1.24% 0.05% 0.97% 0.03% 9.12% 1.58% 6.85% 3.03% 11.97% 4.51% 14.44% 0.30% 3.39% 0.37% 3.50% 0.04% 11.93%
Renren 8.15% 17.99% 12.32% 24.15% 0.07% 19.19% 1.03% 2.77% 1.57% 4.33% 1.65% 7.30% 0.52% 7.47% 0.78% 10.54% 0.20% 6.97%
Rockyou 0.21% 1.56% 0.17% 2.12% 0.04% 10.35% 2.01% 5.28% 2.98% 8.46% 4.83% 13.43% 1.09% 6.14% 2.10% 8.82% 0.12% 13.70%
Tianya 0.59% 2.00% 0.53% 3.15% 0.01% 6.27% 1.10% 2.53% 1.78% 3.98% 1.25% 7.84% 0.47% 2.52% 0.72% 3.02% 0.11% 7.05%
Training Tianya Gamigo
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 0.04% 1.07% 0.00% 0.51% 0.82% 8.49% 0.02% 4.54% 0.29% 2.34% 0.04% 14.91%
LinkedIn 0.09% 1.83% 0.04% 0.37% 0.02% 5.82% 0.00% 3.96% 0.02% 0.27% 0.11% 10.87%
Renren 0.75% 8.57% 0.62% 8.68% 0.05% 6.01% 0.00% 2.08% 0.03% 0.25% 0.07% 5.55%
Rockyou 0.20% 1.95% 0.08% 0.85% 0.03% 5.30% 0.01% 3.49% 0.09% 0.32% 0.19% 11.80%
Tianya 1.00% 5.22% 0.62% 5.29% 0.02% 9.33% 0.01% 1.91% 0.05% 0.22% 0.04% 5.46%
Table 7: Password Cracking (Yahoo’s Password Checker).
Training Renren LinkedIn Rockyou
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 1.23% 6.47% 1.09% 8.03% 8.55% 8.07% 5.97% 8.83% 7.28% 10.80% 8.89% 8.68% 2.04% 8.39% 3.49% 9.46% 8.85% 8.71%
LinkedIn 1.12% 7.81% 0.91% 8.89% 7.86% 9.77% 7.38% 12.39% 8.85% 15.74% 9.95% 11.44% 2.12% 10.98% 3.32% 11.27% 8.35% 11.35%
Renren 8.19%22.32%9.03%27.74%14.69%22.22%13.93%18.97%14.08%19.25%15.99%16.50% 6.64% 20.82% 8.12% 18.54%15.08%18.51%
Rockyou 4.69%18.72%3.42%19.75%16.73%22.66%18.58%24.19%18.17%25.16%20.54%24.18%10.01%26.32%13.15%29.37%17.76%27.06%
Tianya 1.24% 3.59% 1.10% 4.14% 2.14% 3.24% 2.44% 3.50% 2.69% 3.99% 2.49% 3.60% 1.10% 3.53% 1.42% 3.77% 1.97% 4.16%
Training Tianya Gamigo
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 0.41% 1.98% 0.11% 0.89% 7.51% 6.04% 3.02% 5.22% 2.55%10.48% 8.57% 8.38%
LinkedIn 0.41% 2.43% 0.09% 0.90% 6.89% 6.52% 3.00% 5.41% 1.53% 9.54% 7.87% 7.61%
Renren 2.87%10.19%1.26% 7.37% 12.01%11.31%7.32%11.40%3.55%14.48%14.29%13.19%
Rockyou 1.93% 7.61% 0.40% 2.44% 13.03%11.25%8.76%13.21%3.98%16.77%16.71%16.24%
Tianya 1.42% 3.33% 3.67%46.36% 2.21% 4.25% 1.00% 2.06% 0.72% 2.74% 1.67% 1.43%
Table 8: Password Cracking (12306’s Password Checker).
Training Renren LinkedIn Rockyou
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 1.78%24.57%1.17% 6.76% 0.00%32.19%6.02%33.66%7.43%32.37%16.40%38.33%6.39%33.54% 7.43% 31.08%0.12%40.54%
LinkedIn 0.41%12.59%0.28% 2.74% 0.00%16.44%2.17%22.72%4.30%24.84% 8.06% 23.59%1.98%17.60% 2.08% 13.19%0.01%22.51%
Renren 4.25%30.10%4.62%15.09%0.00%26.91%7.58%27.60%7.66%24.72% 9.55% 31.99%8.26%29.57% 9.10% 24.41%0.15%33.51%
Rockyou 2.23%24.20%1.26% 8.57% 0.00%25.94%7.28%27.71%7.40%25.60%11.48%30.01%9.17%31.42%10.68%30.78%0.02%31.52%
Tianya 1.61%17.38%1.78% 6.65% 0.00%13.36%2.23%15.96%3.16%12.53% 4.79% 18.51%2.58%15.91% 2.90% 11.06%0.03%21.57%
Training Tianya Gamigo
Algorithms JtR OMEN PCFG JtR OMEN PCFG
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S
Gamigo 1.29%22.17%0.43% 8.72% 0.00%36.00%1.35%35.20%1.11%19.66%0.06%35.57%
LinkedIn 0.31%12.13%0.11% 3.48% 0.00%19.34%0.16%19.01%0.24% 6.55% 0.03%18.00%
Renren 5.46%31.99%4.55%21.23%0.00%33.43%0.91%26.84%0.91%13.04%0.08%24.34%
Rockyou 1.73%21.75%0.00% 9.02% 0.00%28.73%1.25%28.01%0.68%14.65%0.09%27.02%
Tianya 3.60%25.29%0.00%22.90%0.00%26.69%0.23%14.30%0.40% 4.26% 0.02%11.41%
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still more vulnerable to training-based attacks when the adversary obtains the checker.
Since the training-based crackers only become more powerful when the training data
is more similar to the target data, in our evaluation model, the Selective Training
data is more similar to the Testing data, which further implies that the checkers
exert bias on the selected passwords. Due to the nature that password policies and
scoring mechanisms are static, the password distribution is consistently biased. Such
bias, while not necessarily enforcing good password strength, poses significant threats
on the overall password dataset security. Therefore, it is meaningful to address this




DYNAMIC PASSWORD POLICY GENERATOR
One could argue that a potential solution to the password checker limitations is to
have better web technologies to hide the policies and detect malignant password
strength querying. However, it can result in delay in strength feedback and high
false-positive rates in detection. Further, it does not resolve the fundamental bias
in password distribution. Therefore, we take another approach to the problem and
explore the feasibility of providing dynamic password policies to users. Considering
usability, rather than forcing all users to create extremely complex passwords, we focus
on the overall strength of the password dataset and ensure that the passwords created
by the users have diversity (i.e., cover the vast majority of the entire password space
uniformly). In this chapter, we propose the Dynamic Password Policy Generator,
namely DPPG, as an alternative to traditional password strength checkers.
4.1 Overview
DPPG is a diversity-based and database-aware application that generates password
creation policies dynamically for the users. Instead of purely focusing on the com-
plexity of candidate passwords, DPPG enforces a baseline complexity on the pass-
words (e.g., more than 6 characters long) to protect them from simple attacks, e.g.,
Table 9: Password Policy Requirement Types.
Type Description
Length use a range of password length
Composition use a number of different character types
Alternation use a number of character type transitions
Good Chars include specific characters
Bad Chars exclude specific characters
Structure use a specific structure
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dictionary, brute-forcing. However, more focus is put on protecting the password dis-
tribution within a database by preventing aggregation of similar passwords that form
a characteristically biased distribution. As long as a candidate password meets the
policy, it is accepted and no additional strength feedback is provided. The policies are
generated to search for candidate passwords that balance the password characteristics
distribution. The underlying diversity-based metric implemented in DPPG is further
elaborated in Chapter 5.
In Figure 3, we show how DPPG works. Initially, system administrators can place
complex or random passwords as seeds in the password database. The seeds can form
a white list to inject certain desired password characteristics, e.g., structures, n-grams.
Based on the seeds, DPPG can start to generate password policies to users. Since
dynamically generating policies requires necessary computational time depending on
the number of existing passwords, to avoid delay in responding to users’ requests, a
policy queue is used to store policies as a buffer each time when a batch of policies
are created. When the size of the policy queue reduces below a threshold, e.g., 25%,
DPPG is signalled to generate new policies.
4.2 Two Modes: Explore and Exploit
In order to intelligently generate password policies based on the current password
distribution, DPPG maintains a global characteristics frequency map and a history of
generated password policies1 that can approximate the current password distribution.
There are two modes for DPPG to expand the usable password space and balance
the current password distribution.
The exploration mode mainly aims to expand the password space by actively
introducing new characteristics based on the global characteristics frequency map.
Before an incoming password is hashed, DPPG extracts its characteristics and stores
1No plain text passwords are stored.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Password Policy Generator
the metadata in the frequency map, which keeps tracks of the overall distribution of
password attributes e.g., frequency of structures, characters, and denotes the current
password space. In exploration mode, DPPG creates policies that require users to
be more “creative” in making a password e,g., using the character “(” which is not
usual even in special characters. In this way, the passwords can cover a larger textual
search space than the regular human linguistic patterns. Initially when there are
not many passwords, a random mechanism is adjusted to launch the exploration
mode more often to aggressively enlarge the password space. When the password
characteristics distribution is relatively uniform as observed from the exploitation
mode, the exploration mode is also evoked to introduce new characteristics.
Since purely expanding the password space is equivalent to making random pass-
words, DPPG also relies on another major component. The exploitation mode
aims to enhance password diversity and balance the current password distribution,
with the help of the password policy history. Since passwords are hashed in the
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database, DPPG stores previously generated password policies to approximate cur-
rent password distributions and analyze the password diversity through the metric
and algorithm discussed in Chapter 5. DPPG then identifies password characteristics
that exist in the database with low appearance frequencies, and generate policies that
require such characteristics. Therefore, DPPG creates policies that are usable and
balance the password distribution by temporarily increasing the frequencies of less
common password attributes.
Based on the two modes, DPPG determines the critical characteristics require-
ments, but only renders the final policies after passing them to the usability control
module. In our implementation, there are 6 types of requirements that can form
a policy as shown in Table 9, and the usability control module is evoked to ensure
that the final policies contain only a reasonable number of requirements and are in
different formats as shown in examples below.
Include the character(s): ‘v’, ‘Z’
Avoid the character(s): a, s, e
Use the structure: LLLLLUUS
Number of characters: 8 to 12 (inclusively)
Number of character types: 4
Number of alternations: 3 to 4 (inclusively)
Include the character(s): ‘?’, ‘U’, ‘)’
4.3 Usability Analysis
The usability of DPPG can translate into the ability for users to follow the policies
and maintain the passwords they create. In this chapter, we test DPPG on real users
and collect passwords for further analysis.
Recruitment. After our protocol was approved by the Institutional Review
Board (IRB), we conducted a usability test of DPPG on Amazon Mechanical Turk [1].
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Table 10: Mechanical Turk User Study.
DPPG
Times 0 1 2 3
Session 0 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
# 74 3 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
% 91.36% 4.94% 2.47% 1.23%
QQ Checker
Times 0 1 2 3
Session 0 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
# 75 2 0 1 2 1 3 0 0 0
% 92.59% 3.70% 3.70% 0.00%
We restricted the participants to a qualification type that requires at least 95% of
approval rate, and 500 approved tasks. We excluded minors and only included English
speakers. Our recruitment statement on Mechanical Turk is attached in the appendix.
Protocol. Our approach is to test if users who create their passwords by DPPG
policies can successfully remember them for a reasonable time period. We also require
the same participants to create passwords using QQ’s password strength checker as
the control group. The participants are not informed of the purpose of our study
or anything introduced in this thesis. Each participant who accepts our human in-
telligence task (HIT) on Amazon Mechanical Turk is asked to access our web server
with registration and login services. Participants are asked to complete 4 sessions
of experiments which are separated by time intervals of 24 hours, 48 hours, and 72
hours to finish the entire study.
In the first session, the participant is directed to visit two artificial websites to
register two accounts with usernames and passwords, following a DPPG policy and
using QQ’s checker, respectively. Then the participant simply concludes the session
by logging into the accounts with the credentials they just created. For the rest of the
sessions, participants simply return to our web interface during the time specified at
the end of each previous session and logged into the accounts with their credentials.
All participants are informed in the beginning of the study that forgetting their
passwords during the study was fine and would not penalize them. If they did forget
their passwords, they were prompted to make new ones.
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Due to our task requirements, participants are involved for 6-7 days to attend
all sessions. The total in-session time is around 12 minutes. We paid $1.5 to each
participant who completed all sessions in time. In order to collect more passwords
for further analysis, we made the tasks on mechanical turk viewable to all qualified
users who can attempt using DPPG before deciding to join the study. We also hosted
standalone sessions purely to collect passwords from users. Although passwords are
stored in plain text for future analysis, they are not visible to DPPG which only
approximates password distribution by the history of policies. We present the details
of the user-study documents e.g., consent form, session screen shots in the appendix.
Results. After we conducted our study on Amazon Mechanical Turk for 1.5
months, there are 115 users who accepted our study and 81 of them finished 4 sessions
completely. Since we do not keep track of participants’ email addresses for privacy
reasons, we do not explicitly survey those who dropped out of the study. We show
the results based on the records of these 81 participants in Table 10, where Times
denotes the number of sessions where participants failed to log in with the correct
passwords after some trials, and Session denotes the indices of the sessions where users
re-created passwords. The column with 0 in times and session indicates participants
who logged in all sessions successfully. From the results, we see that 74 participants
out of 81 consecutively succeeded in logging into our sessions with the right passwords
they created according to the policies thus demonstrating the ability to remember the
passwords up to a week. Of the 7 participants who forgot their passwords in at least
one session, 4, 2, and 1 of them had to re-create their passwords in exactly 1, 2, and
3 sessions, respectively. Most of the participants who had to re-create passwords in
one session did it in session 2 and if the participant successfully logs in in session 2,
it is almost certain for them to pass the rest of the sessions. QQ’s checker as the
control group shows very similar statistics but is slightly better. This demonstrates
that policies generated dynamically from DPPG are usable, in terms of the ability of
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users to maintain the passwords.
Furthermore, the passwords from DPPG and QQ’s checker share 54 out of 90 pass-
words in common. Since password policies from DPPG are dynamic, unpredictable
and in various templates, a more likely explanation for this phenomenon is that about
half of the users reused passwords created with DPPG for the QQ’ checker. Although
reusing passwords is a bad practice, this implies that users either reuse the passwords
to get strong strength feedback in QQ’s checker, or to better maintain the passwords.
In a final survey, we further obtain subjective feedback on the usability of DPPG
and QQ’s checker. When asked about the ease in following the policies or strength
feedback, 63.75% and 73.75% of participants thought DPPG and QQ’s checker, re-
spectively were above average. In addition, 65.43% and 61.73% thought DPPG and
QQ’s checker, respectively enable them to make more secure passwords. Finally,
77.78% of participants indicate the passwords they created with DPPG are drastically
different from their other passwords and the rest indicated the passwords are some-
what similar but not the same. This shows that DPPG helps reduce the frequency
of reusing passwords because users are unlikely to leverage their other passwords to
satisfy the dynamic policies.
4.4 Passwords Evaluation
Using a total of 467 passwords collected from our usability study and other standalone
sessions, which we denote as the Mturk dataset, we provide a statistical analysis of
the password characteristics. In order to have a comparison with passwords created
without DPPG, we randomly sampled the same number of passwords from datasets
shown in Table 1 to form other testing datasets.
To compare the password space in the testing datasets, we conduct a character
distribution analysis shown in Figure 4 (a). We assign each unique character existing




Figure 4: Mturk Password Analysis.
plot, we see that the Mturk dataset contains more unique characters in its passwords
than any of the other testing datasets. The character distribution of the Mturk
dataset is also more uniform than the other datasets, suggesting that DPPG can
expand the password space while also enforcing a balanced password distribution.
In Figure 4 (b), we conduct a similar analysis on the password structure. Again,
the Mturk dataset demonstrates the largest variety of password structures among all
the testing datasets and a fairly balanced distribution. Such diversity in password
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structure is meaningful and implies that a structure-based cracking algorithm like
PCFG will be less efficient in cracking the datasets, because all structures are almost
equally likely.
To further compare the security of the Mturk dataset and other testing datasets,
we employ an attack-based analysis using the datasets in Table 1 excluding the data
in the testing datasets for training to crack the Mturk and other testing datasets
with 10 billion guesses. To eliminate the bias due to a small sample size of the testing
data, we re-sample testing datasets and crack them in 10 repeated sessions to obtain
the average cracking rates. Table 11 shows the partial cracking results of Mturk,
LinkedIn, and Renren datasets, and the full results are in the appendix. As we see,
compared to other testing datasets, the Mturk dataset is much less vulnerable to the
attacks. This is consistent with the results in Figure 4. It also shows that passwords
created with DPPG policies are more diverse and dissimilar to other passwords, thus
being more secure from training-based cracking.
One interesting observation is that although the LinkedIn dataset has a very
close structure distribution with Mturk dataset in Figure 4 (b), and also a sub-
optimal character distribution in Figure 4 (a), it is still noticeably more vulnerable
to cracking than the Mturk dataset. Since the performance of the training-based
cracking algorithms mainly depends on the training data as shown in previous work,
it means that our training datasets are much more similar to the LinkedIn target
sample than to the Mturk dataset.
In Table 12, we show more results on cracking analysis on the Mturk dataset and
the samples from datasets shown in Table 1. We see that cracking performance on
the Mturk dataset is much worse than the other datasets, which is consistent with
results shown in Figure 4 and conclusions in this section.
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Table 11: Cracking Evaluation on Mturk Passwords
JtR Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Mturk 4.93% 7.92% 7.49% 7.49% 7.28%
LinkedIn Sample 22.27% 26.34% 19.49% 23.98% 11.35%
Renren Sample 59.31% 63.60% 71.52% 67.02% 68.95%
OMEN Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Mturk 5.35% 7.49% 7.49% 7.71% 6.00%
LinkedIn Sample 11.35% 24.84% 11.13% 21.20% 3.64%
Renren Sample 41.97% 56.75% 62.96% 60.17% 53.10%
PCFG Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Mturk 2.57% 3.43% 3.00% 3.43% 4.71%
LinkedIn Sample 17.77% 19.91% 17.99% 19.06% 17.13%
Renren Sample 28.91% 30.62% 50.54% 44.11% 52.46%
Table 12: Mturk Dataset Evaluation.
JtR Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Mturk 4.93% 7.92% 7.49% 7.49% 7.28%
Gamigo Sample 16.06% 17.34% 14.56% 17.34% 9.85%
LinkedIn Sample 22.27% 26.34% 19.49% 23.98% 11.35%
Renren Sample 59.31% 63.60% 71.52% 67.02% 68.95%
Rockyou Sample 57.82% 62.10% 54.39% 64.03% 46.68%
Tianya Sample 57.17% 62.53% 71.73% 65.31% 73.88%
OMEN Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Mturk 5.35% 7.49% 7.49% 7.71% 6.00%
Gamigo Sample 13.06% 17.13% 9.42% 16.92% 4.28%
LinkedIn Sample 11.35% 24.84% 11.13% 21.20% 3.64%
Renren Sample 41.97% 56.75% 62.96% 60.17% 53.10%
Rockyou Sample 42.18% 53.53% 41.97% 62.74% 20.34%
Tianya Sample 45.40% 57.39% 65.10% 62.53% 62.31%
PCFG Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Mturk 2.57% 3.43% 3.00% 3.43% 4.71%
Gamigo Sample 10.49% 10.92% 10.71% 12.85% 11.13%
LinkedIn Sample 17.77% 19.91% 17.99% 19.06% 17.13%
Renren Sample 28.91% 30.62% 50.54% 44.11% 52.46%
Rockyou Sample 40.90% 38.54% 43.25% 47.97% 41.11%
Tianya Sample 25.48% 26.98% 43.04% 42.40% 59.96%
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4.5 Prevention and Detection of Misuse
While DPPG aims to protect users’ passwords, it is important to understand how
it can be misused and leveraged by the adversary. It would be no surprise if the
adversary can eventually hack the server of DPPG and obtain crucial information on
the password distribution. In this section, we discuss the security of DPPG and the
impact of possible misuse.
First we assume the adversary seeks to obtain crucial information on the password
distribution by monitoring the dynamic password policies. Since the policies are
designed to request diverse passwords that are dissimilar to the existing passwords,
they only reflect password characteristics that are rare or absent, which is not useful
information for cracking. In fact, the general password space is approximately infinite,
and the usable passwords created by people only take a smart part of it. Therefore,
the adversary cannot infer the current password distribution from the policies. The
adversary may try to record the password policies they see by not submitting a
password during registration so as to learn what policies other users might follow.
For unfulfilled password policies, DPPG is designed to expire such policies within
a short period of time, by artificially creating dummy passwords according to the
policies. Such dummy passwords can be selected from leaked password data.
Next, we consider the scenario where the adversary can hack into the hosting
server and obtain subsets of password hashes and the metadata used in DPPG. The
most sensitive information from the generator is the global frequency map, which
stores the appearance frequencies of password characteristics. While the dynamic
policies presented to users reveal password characteristics not in the database, the
metadata that is leaked may expose the characteristics in the database. However,
the global frequency map will ideally present a nearly uniform distribution because
DPPG tries to constantly balance the current distribution. The adversary is likely
to see password structures with similar possibilities as shown in Figure 4, and has
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to enumerate all possible cases. Furthermore, no semantic or positional information
is stored in the map. Therefore, the adversary can only leverage this information
minimally and will still need to put a significant amount of effort in cracking the
password hashes. This scenario is further discussed in Chapter 5.4 when we evaluate
the cracking performance on diverse passwords.
Remarks. To the best of our knowledge, DPPG is the first password policy
generator that can generate password policies dynamically according to the current
password distribution. Since no password strength feedback is returned and the poli-
cies generated by DPPG are dynamic and unpredictable, the attacker will find it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to learn the system or the inner password distri-
bution. The policies themselves are in different formats and only contain information
that is ideally contrary to the distribution in the database, because DPPG always
tries to balance the current distribution and expanding password space. Through the
characteristics analysis and the attack-based evaluation, we further verify that pass-
word datasets created with DPPG are diverse and relatively robust to training-based
cracking attacks. Furthermore, the usability of DPPG is not sacrificed for dynamic
policies according to our user study, which makes DPPG practical to use. Therefore,
DPPG can be a more secure alternative to current password strength checkers in terms





In this chapter, we propose to measure the strength of a password dataset in terms
of password distribution, by evaluating the password diversity in the dataset.
We define password diversity as within a password dataset, how dissimilar pass-
words are with each other regarding a specific set of characteristics. For example,
“forgetme886 ” and “iloveyou775 ” are very similar even though they don’t share many
common characters. They are similar because they both have 11 characters; they con-
tain only lower-case English alphabets and numerical digits; and they are composed
by 8 letters followed by 3 digits. If password length, types of characters and structure
are the characteristics of individual passwords used to determine similarity, we can
claim these two passwords are very similar. However, it is also interesting to point
out that, if we want to consider more sophisticated characteristic such as semantics,
the actual meaning of words in the passwords can conversely make them less similar.
Therefore, the similarity should be a conglomerate measure of all password properties
of interest, rather than a measure of a single or typical attribute.
In a password dataset, the distribution of such characteristics can then be used
to describe the diversity of the passwords. If the distribution is closer to a uniform
Table 13: Password Attributes.
Attribute Type Weight Function
Length absolute w1 f
1
pij
Comp absolute w2 f
2
pij
Alt absolute w3 f
3
pij









LCS relative w8 f
8
pij
LDist relative w9 f
9
pij
Alt-Str absolute w10 f
10
pij
LCS-Str relative w11 f
11
pij




distribution, the passwords are less similar to each other and the password dataset
is more diverse. In this chapter, we will quantify password similarity and provide a
systematic way to measure the dataset-wise diversity.
5.1 Password Similarity Measure
To quantify password similarity, we first clarify the characteristics that are consid-
ered in our measure in Table 13. The type of attributes is absolute if the attribute
is independent and contribute to restraining the password space, or relative if it is
dependent of both passwords that are in comparison and does not affect the password
space. The weight of each attribute is its weight in the password similarity quantifi-
cation. The function associated with each attribute, is a normalized measure of the
difference between such attributes in two passwords, pi and pj, when quantifying
their similarity. The choices of attributes are elaborated as follows.
Length is the number of characters in a password. Almost all password policies
and strength checkers enforce a minimum length limit due to brute-force attack.
f 1pij = 1−
|length of pi − length of pj|
max{length of pi, length of pj}
(1)
Comp is the number of different character types used in the password. L, U, D, and S
represent lower-case characters, upper-case characters, numerical digits, and special
characters, respectively. In password policies and checkers, Comp is also a popular
measure. In previous analysis [113], it is shown that requiring more character types
reduces usability of the passwords.
f 2pij = 1−
|comp of pi − comp of pj|
4
(2)
Alt is short for alternation, which means the number of character switches in a pass-
word normalized by the password length. For example, “pssS55” has 3 alternations
at “p-s”, “s-S”, and “S-5” and 2 structural alternations at “s-S”, and “S-5”. It is
meaningful to consider alternation in that it relates to both semantic and structural
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information about the password. Furthermore, alternation is another strong factor in
limiting the usability of a password. DPPG limits the alternations in the policies it
generates to make them more usable.
f 3pij = 1− |
alt of pi
length of pi − 1
− alt of pj
length of pj − 1
| (3)
CompFreq is the character type appearance frequency.
f 4−7pij = 1− |CompFreq in pi − CompFreq in pj| (4)
LCS stands for longest common substring, which is a relative attribute. For a pair of
passwords in comparison, we regard the length of the longest common substring as a
shared attribute.
f 8pij = 1−
LCS(pi, pj)
min{length of pi, length of pj}
(5)
LDist is Levenshtein Distance, which calculates the minimum number of character
changes, through insertion, modification, and deletion, that are needed to transform
one password to another.
f 9pij = 1−
LevenshteinDistance(pi, pj)
max{length of pi, length of pj}
(6)
We use S(pi) to indicate the structure of pi, and Alt-Str, LCS-Str, and LDist-Str
in Table 13 to account for structural information when quantifying the similarity of
two passwords.
f 10pij = 1− |
alt of S(pi)
length of pi − 1
− alt of S(pj)
length of pj − 1
| (7)
f 11pij = 1−
LCS(S(pi), S(pj))
min{length of pi, length of pj}
(8)
f 12pij = 1−
LevenshteinDistance(S(pi), S(pj))
max{length of pi, length of pj}
(9)
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To the best of our knowledge, our quantification of the password similarity is the
first attempt to provide a comparable measure on how similar two passwords are with
regards to various primitive attributes of the passwords. Different from [108] and [24]
where only structure and n-gram, respectively is considered, our quantification takes
into account a vector of password attributes and has the flexibility to allow weight
adjustment for better performance. By assigning different weights to the password
characteristics, researchers can put more focus on the evaluation of specific attributes.
This is also potentially helpful when new attack models/algorithms emerge based on
a composite of the password characteristics. We use 1
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for all weights by default to
consider all attributes equally for the purpose of this thesis, and we discuss further
on weights selection in the next section. More sophisticated password attributes, e.g.,
semantics, positions of characters can be added to the quantification of password
similarity thus making the approach extensible. Based on this quantification, we
further propose a metric and a systematic way to measure the diversity of a password
dataset.
5.2 Weights Selection
The weights of different password attributes are important factors in the quantifica-
tion and provide flexibility for system administrators or password researchers. For
example, if one wants to evaluate the strength of a password dataset typically against
PCFG, the weights of the structure-related attributes e.g., Alt-Str, LCS-Str, and
LDist-Str can be adjusted to higher values while still taking into account other less
relevant attributes; if they want to evaluate the strength typically against a Markov
attack model like OMEN, the weight of the attribute n-gram can be increased ac-




be assigned to the attributes.
The careful selection of the proper weight values can be studied using sophisti-
cated machine learning techniques and would be itself an interesting and meaningful
research topic. For the purpose of this thesis, we do not delve into very complicated
models to try to obtain an absolutely optimal set of weights. Instead, we propose a
simple and intuitive way that solves the problem to learn a reasonable selection of
the weights shown in Figure 5.
We first initialize the weights vector W, with each element valued at 0.5, which
means all attributes in the similarity vector Vpij are equally considered. Then we
need some “ground truth” that tells us if two passwords are really similar. Utilizing
the state-of-the-art cracking algorithms and leaked password datasets, intuitively, we
claim that the passwords cracked by the algorithms are similar to the passwords used
to train the algorithms.
From a leaked password dataset, we randomly select a portion of the passwords
as training data denoted as set T, and use the remaining passwords as target data.
Then we crack the target data with PCFG, OMEN, and JtR using the same training
data and limiting the guess number of each algorithm to 10 billion. We aggregate
the cracked passwords into a set denoted as P, and the “ground truth” is thus that
all training passwords in T are similar to all cracked passwords in P. Finally we form
a bipartite graph between the two sets and each pair of passwords maintain an edge
with a computed similarity vector.
In the final step, we traverse each edge in the bipartite graph and evaluate each
similarity vector. For each similarity vector, we sort the attribute values and increase
the weights of the top 4 attributes by 1
2×|P| , and decrease those of the bottom 4
attributes by 1
2×|P| . Therefore, we obtain an adjusted weight vector with reasonable
values.
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Figure 5: Weights Model
5.3 Diversity-based Metric: Graph Model and Communities
To evaluate the diversity of a sizeable password dataset, we propose to group pass-
words into communities based on our similarity quantification. A password com-
munity contains passwords that have higher similarity with each other, than with
passwords in other communities. When password datasets are large, the password
diversity can then be represented by the number of communities detected, and the
sizes of the communities.
Conceptually and computationally, we connect passwords in a graph model which
enables us to analyze the similarities among the passwords. Each password dataset
can be built into a graph, with nodes being the passwords, and edges being their
relations weighted by the pairwise similarity score quantified in the previous section.
For a password dataset, we can compute a similarity score for each pair of passwords
and obtain a weighted complete graph.
The password graph preserves the similarities among the passwords and is con-
venient for further analysis of password diversity. Since community detection on a
complete graph results in overwhelming time and space complexity, we further make
the graph sparser by cutting edges that have weights less than a threshold, which is
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Figure 6: Attack-based Evaluation
Table 14: Diversity-based Password Security Metric.
Dataset Std/Mean DivScore Dataset Std/Mean DivScore
Renren 1.63 0.61 Sample 1.97 0.51
Tianya 1.40 0.71 Sample 1.87 0.53
Rockyou 1.27 0.79 Sample 2.03 0.49
LinkedIn 1.11 0.90 Sample 2.23 0.45
Gamigo 0.44 2.27 Sample 2.28 0.44
- - - Mturk 0.38 2.61
by default the mean value of all weights. Then we use a simple, light-weight, and
efficient algorithm, the Louvain Method [15], to detect communities in the passwords
graph. Finally, we calculate the diversity-based password dataset score DivScore by
dividing the mean value of the sizes of detected communities by the standard devi-
ation of the sizes. We show that DivScore can serve as an indicator of the overall
security of a password dataset in the next section. The diversity-based metric also
serves as a critical component in the exploitation mode of DPPG. By analyzing the
password policy history and using passwords from leaked datasets, DPPG simulates
the stored hashed passwords and evaluate the current password diversity to determine
the new policy requirements balancing the password distribution.
5.4 Evaluation of the Diversity Measure
Table 15: Cracking Results of the Mturk Dataset.
Training: Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
JtR 6.42% 9.85% 7.71% 8.14% 6.85%
OMEN 7.49% 8.57% 7.49% 7.28% 6.00%
PCFG 1.93% 1.71% 1.71% 2.14% 1.93%
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Figure 7: Diversity-based Cracking.
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To evaluate the robustness of our metric, we look at both its effectiveness in pro-
tecting passwords from cracking models, and its possibility to leak important pass-
word distribution information like existing commercial strength checkers discussed in
Chapter 3.
5.4.1 Attacking without Metric Details
In Figure 6, we describe the attack model to test if our proposed diversity-based
measure can protect password datasets. We randomly select 50% of passwords from
datasets shown in Table 1 and use them to train the cracking algorithms. From the
other half of the passwords, we construct a password graph and run the Louvain
Method to detect communities. Based on the number of communities and sizes of
communities, we randomly select a fixed number of passwords from each of the com-
munities as the selected samples. In our experiment setup, in each dataset we detect
5 communities. To make the selected sample size non-trivial, we randomly select
20000 passwords from each of the communities and thus obtaining 100000 passwords
in each selected sample.
Finally, from the same password data we use to build the graph model, we ran-
domly select 100000 passwords to form the random samples. Therefore, we obtain
a selected sample that is based on our diversity-based metric, and a random sample
that has statistically the same password distribution with the original dataset. We
crack these two samples separately, with 10 billion guesses.
In the left part of Table 14, we show the diversity scores computed with the
diversity metric of the 5 datasets. Ranked by the scores in ascending order, we
see that Renren has the lowest diversity score while Gamigo has the highest. This
suggests that Gamigo has a relatively more uniform distribution than other datasets
and Renren has the most unbalanced distribution.
In Figure 7, we show the cracking results of the attack model. RS denotes the
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random samples and SS-I denotes the selected sample from the password communities.
For all datasets, the random samples have more cracked passwords than the selected
sample. The selected sample is formed with regards to the diversity metric which aims
to eliminate bias on the dataset and make the password distribution more uniform.
Therefore, the selected sample is less vulnerable to algorithms trained with biased
password distribution.
Furthermore, we see in Figure 6 that the general cracking rates for the datasets
tend to follow an order of the ranking in Table 14. Renren, Tianya, and Rockyou
have the highest cracking rates by JtR at 71.63%, 71.86%, and 66.38%, respectively,
which are drastically higher than that in LinkedIn and Gamigo. This is consistent
to statistics shown in Table 14 where Renren, Tianya, and Rockyou have similar
diversity scores that are the lowest. Gamigo, having the highest diversity score, does
have the lowest cracking rates with regards to all the cracking algorithms. Therefore,
Figure 6 and Table 14 show consistent results, which means our diversity-based metric
can provide effective and accurate indication on the security of passwords dataset.
5.4.2 Attacking with Metric Details
To examine if our metric has the same limitations as password strength checkers in
Chapter 3, we conduct the same evaluation illustrated in Figure 1. We use the training
data in Section 5.4.1 as nonselective training and the selected sample (SS-I in Figure
3) as the testing data. Assuming the attacker can obtain complete details of our
metric including the weight values, and apply it to select training data by detection
communities, we draw random samples from each of the communities to build the
Selective Training dataset in the same way as we build the selected sample in Section
5.4.1. In this set up, we ensure the cracking evaluation results are comparable and
we place them in the same figure denoted as SS-II.
From Figure 6, we see that PCFG has better cracking performance consistently
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when trained with nonselective training, which implies the selective training does not
introduce a similar structural distribution to the cracker. However, it is interesting
that OMEN shows the exact opposite case with better performance when trained
with nonselective training. JtR on the other hand, does not break the tie consistently
either. The cracking rates of each scenario are generally very close with the Nonselec-
tive and Selective training, which is different from the obvious contrast observed in
password strength checkers in Figure 2. The phenomenon shows that selective train-
ing in this case, may or may not enhance training-based cracking attack, and does
not reveal useful password distribution to the adversary. This is reasonable because
our diversity metric aims to balance the password distribution and eliminate possible
bias. Therefore, it is not of typical interest for the adversary to leverage our diversity
metric to enhance cracking.
In Table 16 and Table 17, we show the full results of cracking analysis conducted
in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2, respectively.
Table 16: Cross-site Diversity-based Cracking
Training Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
JtR RS SS RS SS RS SS RS SS RS SS
Gamigo 18.78% 13.96% 20.68% 0.00% 17.13% 15.74% 20.60% 0.00% 12.98% 0.00%
LinkedIn 25.29% 21.50% 28.95% 25.03% 21.64% 22.61% 26.86% 25.74% 15.84% 19.70%
Renren 59.11% 44.48% 64.78% 48.66% 71.63% 54.45% 67.40% 52.40% 68.61% 49.14%
Rockyou 59.72% 43.49% 63.31% 47.15% 57.80% 45.76% 66.38% 54.30% 47.48% 38.23%
Tianya 56.68% 28.16% 61.58% 30.13% 68.83% 34.59% 63.92% 31.15% 71.86% 58.51%
Training Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
OMEN RS SS RS SS RS SS RS SS RS SS
Gamigo 12.65% 9.19% 17.81% 12.79% 11.18% 11.91% 18.08% 14.16% 5.16% 9.75%
LinkedIn 12.83% 12.19% 24.63% 19.85% 12.86% 16.91% 22.61% 20.86% 5.12% 14.00%
Renren 42.37% 26.14% 55.82% 35.34% 64.50% 44.85% 61.65% 40.63% 53.75% 33.52%
Rockyou 42.42% 28.23% 55.44% 36.46% 43.66% 32.93% 64.08% 47.08% 20.11% 23.61%
Tianya 44.53% 19.55% 57.43% 25.85% 65.76% 31.17% 60.89% 27.69% 62.91% 29.80%
Training Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
PCFG RS SS RS SS RS SS RS SS RS SS
Gamigo 12.92% 4.84% 13.42% 5.66% 13.79% 6.77% 15.05% 8.81% 13.44% 8.77%
LinkedIn 17.93% 8.50% 19.86% 9.24% 19.30% 11.07% 20.86% 13.65% 18.34% 14.37%
Renren 29.94% 20.53% 30.75% 20.95% 49.92% 32.90% 44.58% 29.59% 52.45% 34.13%
Rockyou 42.89% 23.04% 41.01% 22.01% 44.76% 25.17% 49.38% 31.29% 43.28% 28.11%
Tianya 25.01% 13.79% 28.08% 15.37% 42.80% 22.15% 41.28% 20.95% 58.01% 28.48%
43
Table 17: Selection Attack
JtR Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Gamigo 15.14% 15.44% 15.98% 16.98% 14.41%
LinkedIn 23.53% 26.75% 25.39% 27.34% 21.71%
Renren 46.54% 49.77% 56.20% 52.90% 50.48%
Rockyou 44.17% 50.75% 50.65% 56.42% 42.83%
Tianya 30.12% 29.51% 57.50% 31.21% 58.16%
OMEN Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Gamigo 12.22% 13.14% 11.95% 13.70% 9.17%
LinkedIn 15.95% 22.71% 18.19% 20.99% 13.51%
Renren 31.76% 38.24% 49.42% 41.84% 36.08%
Rockyou 28.79% 41.67% 39.67% 49.73% 24.95%
Tianya 24.80% 26.31% 31.48% 26.94% 37.74%
PCFG Gamigo LinkedIn Renren Rockyou Tianya
Gamigo 2.69% 3.66% 3.55% 3.99% 3.06%
LinkedIn 4.53% 6.75% 5.97% 6.88% 5.11%
Renren 14.09% 16.83% 23.78% 19.43% 18.95%
Rockyou 15.36% 17.37% 19.01% 20.45% 16.64%
Tianya 9.21% 11.27% 13.59% 12.19% 13.90%
5.4.3 Attack on Passwords from User-study
Since the password diversity metric is used as an underlying implementation of the
exploitation mode in DPPG, it is interesting to test the metric and the passwords
created with DPPG in the same experiment. In Table 15, we show the results of
using the selective training in Section 5.4.2 to crack the Mturk dataset in Section 4.3,
which is comparable to the partial results in Table 11. We observe the same incon-
sistencies again in the results of both tables. Further, in the right part of Table 14,
we show that the Mturk dataset has a higher DivScore than other sample datasets.
When trained with random samples from original password datasets, PCFG can crack
more passwords consistently of Mturk dataset and OMEN shows the opposite. The
performance gain of OMEN in all scenarios are noticeable but insignificant. There-
fore, passwords created with DPPG do not share common distribution with other
passwords created using the similar diversity-based algorithm and thus are relatively
secure even if the diversity metric is obtained by the adversary.
Remarks. In this section, to explore the security of password characteristics
distribution, we define password diversity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to quantify the diversity of passwords using various password attributes.
44
Based on password diversity, we propose a useful password security metric to evaluate
the password dataset security. Our metric is different from traditional max-likelihood
or min-entropy metrics which depends on specific rules that relate to individual pass-
word strength. Instead, the metric focuses more on the security of the password
distribution contributed by each individual password. Through several attack-based
evaluations, we show that the diversity metric while improving the security of pass-
word dataset, does not leak crucial information that significantly helps the attacker.
The diversity-based metric also serves as a key component in DPPG in Chapter 4.
Although DPPG uses the policy history to approximate password distribution, it still
maintains accurate metadata with the global frequency map and cracking evaluation




In this thesis, we study the password space and distribution to understand password
dataset security better. Due to the limitation of existing strength measuring mecha-
nisms, we propose a new and usable alternative based on an effective diversity metric
to better protect passwords from offline cracking attacks.
We start by identifying issues with the existing commercial password strength
checkers and evaluate them from the adversarial perspective. While previous work has
analyzed the consistency and accuracy of the checkers, much effort has not been spent
on their limitations of biasing and leaking password distributions to the adversary.
Through our evaluation, we find that password strength checkers are effective in
helping attackers mount more powerful attacks. The reason is that password strength
checkers rely on static scoring policies that exert bias on the password distribution.
The checkers can be leveraged by the attackers easily to select training data that are
similar to the target passwords.
To propose an effective alternative that addresses the limitations of password
strength checkers, we implement DPPG to generate dynamic policies for users, which
is based on a password diversity metric and the current password distribution. To
the best of our knowledge, DPPG is the first dynamic password policy generator
that provides unpredictable dynamic policies and enforces usability control. Through
exploration and exploitation modes, DPPG can expand the password space and bal-
ance password characteristics distribution which increase the overall security of the
password dataset. Through a usability study, we test DPPG in practice and collect
passwords for further analysis. Experiments are also conducted to show that the
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collected passwords are more diverse in their attributes and have good security.
To study the password distribution and its security impact, we define the con-
cept of password diversity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
define and quantify password diversity considering a vector of password attributes.
The quantification is extensible and can be adjusted with different weight values
to shift the focus of measurement. To provide a way to analyze the password di-
versity of a dataset, we propose the diversity-based password security metric which
is a key component for DPPG to generate effective policies. We also evaluate the
metric from an adversarial perspective using it to sample data for an attack-based
evaluation. Through cracking experiments in different setups, we conclude that the
metric is effective in evaluating the security of password datasets and thus can serve




MECHANICAL TURK USER STUDY DOCUMENTS
In this appendix, we present documents relevant to our user study conducted on
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Screenshots of the registration and login pages are also
included.
Recruitment Statement.
We are conducting an experiment which requires you to create and
maintain two user accounts (username and password) on two different
websites. The websites are made up only to help you distinguish the two
accounts. By going to the access link below, you will start a 4-session
experiment with us. Each session is seperated from another by a time
interval. At the end of each session, we will let you know what time you
should return for the next session. Upon completing the last session, you
will receive a pay code. Please copy and paste it into the box below to
receive payment for participation. The entire process has a span of 6-7
days but your in-session participation time will only be around 12
minutes in total, because we ask you to come back to the sessions after




Figure 9: Registration with DPPG.
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Figure 10: Registration with QQ’s checker.
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Figure 11: Login Pages.
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Pointcheval, D., “Provably secure password-based authentication in tls,”
ASIACCS, 2006.
[12] Akpulat, M., Bicakci, K., and Cil, U., “Revisiting graphical passwords
for augmenting, not replacing, text passwords,” ACSAC, 2013.
[13] Amico, M. D., Michiardi, P., and Roudier, Y., “Password strength: An
empirical analysis,” Infocom, 2010.
[14] Argyros, G. and Kiayias, A., “I forgot your password: Randomness attacks
against php applications,” USENIX, 2012.
[15] Blondel, V., Guillaume, J., Lambiotte, R., and Lefebvre, E., “Fast
unfolding of communities in large networks,” Statistical Mechanics: Theory and
Experiment, 2008.
[16] Bojinov, H., Bursztein, E., Boyen, X., and Boneh, D., “Kamouflage:
Loss-resistant password management,” ESORICS, 2010.
52
[17] Bonneau, J., “The science of guessing: Analyzing an anonymized corpus of
70 million passwords,” S&P, 2012.
[18] Bonneau, J., “Guessing human-chosen secrets,” Doctoral, Dissertation.
[19] Bonneau, J., Herley, C., Oorschot, P. C., and Stajano, F., “The
quest to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web
authentication schemes,” S&P, 2012.
[20] Bonneau, J. and Schechter, S., “Towards reliable storage of 56-bit secrets
in human memory,” USENIX, 2014.
[21] Burr, W. E., Dodson, D. F., and Polk, W. T., “Electronic authentication
guideline,” NIST, 2006.
[22] Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A., and Neven, G., “Practical yet univer-
sally composable two-server password-authenticated secret sharing,” CCS, 2012.
[23] Carnavalet, X. C. and Mannan, M., “From very weak to very strong:
Analyzing password-strength meters,” NDSS, 2014.
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